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  In this paper, we study the effects of non-interest activities on return of some Iranian banks over 
the period of 2006-2011 using Pearson correlation as well as regression analysis. The paper 
uses two independent variables where the first one is obtained as a difference between other 
non-interest incomes with commission fee and the second one is the commission fee income. 
There are three dependent variables including return on investment, return of equities and risk, 
leading us to setup three regressions analysis. The result of our survey indicates that non-
interest based activities have meaningful effects on the performances of banks. In addition, 
there are some meaningful relationships among interest free activities, which are mostly in 
terms of negative relations. 
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1. Introduction 
Commercial banks assist their customers to manage the financial risks they could face and one of the 
most important is interest rate risk. For instance, consider a case where we wish to obtain a fixed rate 
mortgage from a particular bank and our goal is to remove most of the interest rate risk related to this 
mortgage. In real-world case studies, the risk is shifted from customer to the bank, when the rate is 
fixed but the bank may lose from changes in interest rates. These changes influence the costs to the 
bank of providing the mortgage and for instance, if market interest rates go up, customer mortgage 
payment to the bank does not change because the rate is fixed. However, the expenditure to the 
lending bank does increase unless it actively manages its cost components. This rise in market 
interest rates increases the bank's funding cost components, that is, the interest rate the bank pays on 
the money it uses to "fund" our mortgage loan.  
Changes in funding expenditures are normally part of the interest rate risk related to a fixed rate 
mortgage loan. Managing this interest rate risk plays important role for the bank as it lessens the   2602
likelihood of extreme fluctuations in the bank's financial circumstances and thus decreases the 
possibility of the bank becoming insolvent. Lessening the likelihood of insolvency permits the bank 
to hold less capital although capital is expensive. Thus, interest rate risk management is an essential 
task for most banks in that it lessens the amount of expensive capital that a bank must hold. A typical 
bank has several methods for managing interest rate risk. Brewer (1989) is one of the people who 
investigated the relationship between bank holding company risk and nonbank activity and the focus 
was on the use of certain interest rate derivative instruments to offset the inherent interest rate risk in 
fixed rate lending.  
An interest rate swap is a financial contract, which allows one party to exchange a set of interest 
payments (say, fixed rate) for another set of interest payments owned by another party (say, floating 
rate). Brewer (1989) investigated the major differences in the financial characteristics of banking 
organizations, which implement derivatives relative to those that do not. The results recommended 
that the performance of users was not better or worse than that of nonusers. De Young and Roland 
(2001) considered product mix and earnings volatility at commercial banks by investigating the 
evidences from a degree of total leverage model. They performed an empirical study of US banks 
and argued that the trend to off-balance sheet activity could increase bank earnings volatility 
because of high competitive rivalry in these markets.  
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) in another investigation found that interest income can be correlated with 
non-interest income because of possible cross-selling of different products to the same customer. 
They also explained that when customers obtain financing from banks they also worry about how to 
repay it and an easy retail payment service can facilitate repayment and attract more customers to 
borrow money from banks. Marcucci and  Quagliariello (2006) investigated the relationships 
between credit risk and the business cycle for financial stability and risk management purposes. 
They argued that many previous studies generally neglected the presence of asymmetric effects, i.e., 
the likelihood that the influence is dissimilar over various phases of the business cycle. They tried to 
use threshold regression models with two or more regimes both at the aggregate and at the 
individual level, exploiting a unique dataset on Italian bank borrowers’ default rates. The study tried 
to figure out whether the relationship between business cycle and credit risk was subject to regime 
switches, determining endogenously the thresholds. The results recommended that the effect of the 
business cycle was more pronounced when starting credit risk levels were higher and during 
downturns. 
Discrete regime switching models may disclose unsatisfactory for dynamic credit risk management. 
For instance, Lucas and Klaassen (2005) explained that the combination of an insufficient 
distinction between multiple economic regimes as well as a lacking identification of these regimes 
could weaken on the capability of these tools to discriminate between default regimes. They also 
explained that implied asset correlations and default rate volatilities were biased towards zero and 
implausibly low. Laeven and Majoni (2003) performed another survey on the effects of macro 
economical factors on banking industry and concluded that macro economic factors play important 
role on increasing credit risk on the market. 
Kraft and Galac (2007) performed a survey in CROEtia and explained that deposit interest rates, 
asset risk and bank failure in that country. In fact, they examined the aftermath of deregulation in 
CROEtia, which incorporated rapid growth of both deposits and deposit interest rates, followed by 
numerous bank failures. They used panel regression techniques and found some evidence of 
“market-stealing” via high deposit interest rates. They connected high deposit interest rates to bank 
failure using Logit models. High deposit interest rates were a reliable signal of risk-taking and when 
supervisory capabilities and powers were weak, deposit interest rate regulation could be worth 
considering. A. Daghighi Asl and S. Yarifard / Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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Liadaki and Gaganis (2010) investigated whether the stock performance of EU listed banks was 
associated with their efficiency. They selected a sample consists of 171 banks operating in 15 EU 
markets over the period 2002–2006. They first used stochastic frontier analysis to evaluate the cost 
and profit efficiency of banks, while controlling for environmental factors. Then, they investigated 
whether changes in profit and cost efficiency were reflected in changes in stock prices. The results 
indicated that the change in profit efficiency had a positive and significant effect on stocks prices; 
however, there was no association between changes in cost efficiency and stock returns. 
Ho (2012) investigated the impacts of market reform on consumers and state commercial banks in 
China. He jointly estimated a system of differentiated product demand and pricing equations under 
alternative market structures and reported some mixed results. Although there was a welfare gain 
from more consumers participating in the deposit market, the existing consumers suffered welfare 
losses because of declined service quality. The welfare impacts were unevenly distributed, with 
losses skewed toward inland provinces and certain consumer groups. There was no clear evidence 
that the pricing of banking services had become more competitive after the reform, and such pricing 
remains subject to government intervention.  
In this paper, we present an empirical study to measure the effects of two important factors of non-
interest income as well as commission-based income on return on equities, return on investment and 
risk structure in banking system. The organization of this paper first present detail of our regression 
models in section 2 and section 3 presents the results of applying three regression models. Finally, 
concluding remarks are given in the last section to summarize the contribution of the paper.  
2. The proposed study 
The proposed study of this paper uses the information of 17 commercial banks including 6 
governmental bank and 11 private banks. To extract the necessary information, official reports 
including statement and balance sheet are used and the data were analyzed using some software 
packages. The proposed study uses three linear regression models. The first one is as follows, 
01 2 , ROI NET COM         (1)   
where NET is the difference between other non-interest incomes with commission fee (COM), ROI 
is the return of investment,  0  , 1   and  2  are the estimated regression function and  is the error 
term. The second model considers return of equities (ROE) with the same independent variables as 
follows, 
01 2 , ROE NET COM         (2)   
And finally the third model uses R is the primary risk of assets and studies the relationship between 
risk (R) with similar independent variables as follows,  
01 2 , RN E T C O M         (3)   
where R is calculated based on the model proposed by Lepetit et al. (2008) as follows, 
R   R₁ R₂ 
ROE
SD  OA   Average  
T     E      /T     A    
SD  OA ),    (4)   
where  1 R is the risk of portfolio,   2 R  is the leverage risk, ROE is the return of equities, SDROE is 
the standard deviation of ROE. 
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The hypotheses investigate whether interest-free activities could impact ROI and ROE and it consists 
of two parts.   
1.  NET and COM impact ROI, significantly.  
2.  NET and COM impact ROE, significantly. 
3. The results   
The proposed study of this paper has used the information of 17 banks and the mean of each 
variable is calculated for six consecutive fiscal years. Table 1 demonstrates some of the descriptive 
information. 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive information of 17 banks within 6 fiscal years  
Variable  COM  NET  ROI  ROE  R  
Mean   0.139   0.355   0.138   0.178   43.24  
Standard deviation  0.248  0.241  0.277  0.153  70.99  
 
 
(5)   
 
                                0.026471 0.071189 0.011544
Standard deviation             0.010603   0.012123            0.015691
 t-value                               2.496437   5.872097     
ROI NET COM  
2
       0.735330
P-value                               0.0144       0.00000              0.4638
D-W=1.691418               S.E. = 0.131006         F=21.87337         R 0.837692 
  
As we can observe from the results, the first independent variable (NET) is statistically meaningful 
(Freedman, 2005) but the second variable does not represent meaningful value. T-student is 
relatively large for NET and the null hypothesis is rejected even when the level of significance is 
one percent. R-square is around 0.84, which means the model can describe 84% of the changes on 
ROI.   
 
(6)  
  
 
                                0.222426 0.076671 0.193857
Standard deviation             0.046399    0.016623            0.097693
 t-value                               4.612278    4.612278   
ROE NET COM  
2
         1.984345
P-value                               0.000000    0.000000             0.0406
D-W=2.284038               S.E. = 0.316671         F=18.62813         R 0.987526 
  
As we can observe from the results of the regression estimation for the second model, all statistical 
values are meaningful. In other word, all t-student values are meaningful when the level of 
significance is five percent. In addition, Durbin Watson value is located within an acceptable limit 
and F-value indicates the whole regression estimation is valid. Finally, 
2 R 0.9875  , which means 
the model could describe 99 percent of the changes on ROE.   
  
(7)  
                                    42.20905  0.0474624 2.595541
Standard deviation             0.219230    0.249360             1.248275
 t-value                             192.5328     -1.9033
RN E T C O M  
2
68            2.079303
P-value                               0.000000    0.0405                0.040700
D-W=1.731328               S.E. = 1.071894         F=26357.74         R 0.999836 
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Finally, the third model also represents some values for NET and COM, which are statistically 
meaningful when the level of significance is five percent. Durbin-Watson is within the acceptable 
value and F-value is highly valuable, which confirms the overall model. Finally, 
2 R 0.9998  , which 
means the model can present over 99 percent of the changes on risk factor. The other observation is 
that NET maintains a negative impact on risk (R) but commission itself increases the risk and this 
results are consistent with the findings of Lepetit et al. (2008). 
 Table 2  
The summary of the test results  
Results Regression analysis   Independent Variables Hypothesis
               
Accept        NET   First
Reject     COM
Accept     NET Second
Accept     COM
Accept     NET Third
Accept        COM
  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented an empirical study to measure the effects of two important factors 
of non-interest income as well as commission-based income on return on equities, return on 
investment and risk structure in banking system of Iran. The proposed study obtained the necessary 
information over the period of 2006-2011 and using regression analysis investigated the effects of 
two mentioned variables on three different variables. The results of our survey indicated that non-
interest based activities had meaningful effects on the performances of banks. In addition, there are 
some meaningful relationships among interest free activities, which are mostly in terms of negative 
relations. 
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